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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
For the purpose of affording relief to a plaintiff in circumstances
where testimony is shown to have become unavailable, a paid bill
may be admitted as prima facie evidence of reasonable value. How-
ever, in order to prevent the mere admission of this evidence from
becoming conclusive in effect, this procedure, if acceptable at all,
should be confined to circumstances of competitive price for proven
work from which a defendant may be reasonably expected to obtain
any existing evidence in rebuttal. By such essential can defendants
be better safeguarded against collusion between the plaintiff and his
doctor and mechanic; speculative fees on the part of the physician
and repairman; and the indifference of a plaintiff to the amount he
has been charged induced by the belief that another has to pay the
charges. As between maintenance of tested safeguards for the estab-
lishing of a bona fide case and the facilitating of prima facie presenta-
tions by allowing freedom to plaintiffs in accident cases, it would
appear that the continuance of the New York requirement of valua-
tion witnesses is to be desired.
HENRY PEYTON WILMOT.
LOCAL PREJUDICE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
The common law rule that an offence shall be prosecuted in the
county or district where it was committed is embodied both in the
United States Constitution 1 and in the constitution or statutes of
many states.2 Conditions may arise which imperil the existence of
a fair and impartial trial in the county wherein the crime has been
committed and a change of venue becomes necessary. The purpose
of a change of venue is to provide against a trial before a jury, where
there is a prejudice, insidious in its nature, which pervades a com-
munity to such an extent that prospective jurors are unconsciously
affected by its influence.3 Local prejudice may arise against the
1 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law."
2 LA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9; MISS. CONST. Art. III, § 26; PA. CONsT. Art. I,
§ 9; WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 22; MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1938)§ 28.985; N. H. REv. LAws (1942) c. 427, § 7; N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCo-
DURE § 284; Wis. STAT. (1943) § 356.01.
3 People v. Williams, 106 Misc. 65, 173 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1919).
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accused because of racial, 4 religious,5 political 6 or personal 7 factors.
It may also exist because of the previous history of the case, as when
there has been a prior trial of an accomplice, or because of news-
paper accounts dealing with the crime.8 Newspaper articles are not
by themselves sufficient evidence of local prejudice as will justify a
change, 9 unless public hostility has been so aroused thereby that it
is improbable that a fair trial can be had.' 0
At times the state may be unable to receive a fair trial and it
desires a change of venue. In Pennsylvania the state is by statute
denied the right to apply for a change." In California the same
result has been reached by the highest state court declaring uncon-
stitutional a statute permitting the state to apply for a change.' 2
This decision has been questioned inasmuch as the state had a right
of removal at common law.1 3  In Arizona,'1 4 Delaware, 15 Illinois,16
and Washington,' 7 by statute, and in Alabama's and Oklahoma' 9
by constitutional provision, the right to the defendant is expressly
4 Change of venue granted, where defendant, a negro in a white community,
had been attacked in numerous newspaper articles. People v. Lucas, 138 Misc.
664, 228 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1928).5 Affidavits tending to show that defendant, a Roman Catholic, could not
secure a fair and impartial trial on a charge of murdering a member of the
Ku Klux Klan in the county where the indictment was found, were sufficient
to require a change of venue. People v. Ryan, 123 Misc. 450, 205 N. Y. Supp.
664 (1924).8 Forgery arising from tax frauds in the City of Albany, became an issue
in the New York state election of 1930. Change of venue granted. People v.
Nathan, 139 Misc. 345, 249 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1931). The City Attorney was
accused of embezzling funds belonging to the community, he was denounced at
political gatherings and through leaflets, and his conduct became a factor in
political campaigns. Change of venue granted. People v. State, 126 Tex. Cr.
35, 70 S. W. (2d) 193 (1934).
7 People v. Georger, 109 App. Div. 111, 95 N. Y. Supp. 790 (1905). In
Sinith v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 53, 55 S. W. 718 (1900), the accused was
related to the leading families of Harlan County. The state contended that it
was impossible to obtain a fair trial there and it was granted a change of venue.
In McRane v. State, 194 So. 632 (Fla. 1940), the victim had been a member of
one of the most respected and influential families, and was related either by
-blood or marriage to over fifty percent of the people in the county. The defen-
dant was granted a change of venue.
8 Horror stories dealing, with the details of the crime. Quinn v. State, 54
Okla. Cr. 179, 16: (2d) 591 (1932).
9 People v. Hines, 168 Misc. 453, N. Y. S. (2d) 15 (1938); People v.
Birndell, 194 App. Div. 776, 185 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1921).
10 People v. Lucas, 131 Misc. 664, 228 N. Y. Supp. 31 (1928); People v.
Jackson, 114 App. Div. 697, 100 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1906).
11: PuRnO's PA. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 555.
12 People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 Pac. 481 (1891).
'13 Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 Atl. 574 (1936); People v.
Webb, 1 Hill 179 (N. Y. 1841).
14 ARIZ. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5022.
15 DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 5306.
26 ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 146, § 18.
37 WASH. Rzv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2018.
28 ALA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6.
19 OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 20.
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granted and by implication is denied to the state. However statutes
expressly granting the prosecution this privilege have been widely
enacted. 20 It has been held that granting a change of venue upon
application by the state does not offend the United States Constitu-
tion.21 In New York it has long been held that the venue in a
criminal action may be changed on motion of the public prosecutor,
if a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the
indictment was found.2 2 The District Attorney may also on applica-
tion remove an indictment from the county court to the supreme
court.2 3  The objection that to grant a change of venue to the pros-
ecution may make it difficult for an impoverished defendant to bring
his witnesses to the new place of trial has been met in New York
by imposing as a condition of the change of venue that the District
Attorney make a satisfactory arrangement for the payment of addi-
tional costs by the county in which the venue was originally laid.24
The initial court should be satisfied that the new county is not in
any way prejudiced against the defendant25
A defendant who wishes a change of venue must make applica-
tion and give notice to the prosecution before trial, although this has
often worked substantial injustice upon a defendant, who has not
had the aid of counsel until shortly before trial.2 6 In New York
the application for an order of removal must be made to the supreme
court at a special term in the district and must be made returnable
at the next special term within the said district, after the motion
papers are served, and upon notice of at least five days to the Dis-
trict Attorney of the county where the indictment is pending, with
a copy of the affidavit or other papers on which the application is
founded. 27  A justice of the supreme court residing in or holding
a term of the supreme court in the district in which the indictment
is pending, may upon good cause and after reasonable notice to the
District Attorney and an opportunity to be heard thereon, make an
20 IOWA CODE (Reichman, 1939) § 13910; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-
1708; FLA. ComP. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 8406; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 10804.
21 People v. Rich, 237 Mich. 481, 212 N. W. 105 (1927).
22 People v. Webb, 1 Hill 179 (N. Y. 1841).
23 People v. Farini, 239 N. Y. 411, 146 N. E. 645 (1925).
24 People v. Baker, 3 Abb. Pr. 42, 3 Parker Cr. 181 ( ).
25 Smith v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 53, 55 S. W. 719 (1900).
26 Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). The defen-
dant did not have the aid of counsel until one hour before the trial. No motion
was made for a continuance or change of venue. During the trial two hundred
officers and men of the National Guard attempted to keep order. If it had not
been for their presence in and about the courtroom, it would have been impos-
sible to hold the trial, and appellant would have been lynched. If he had been
acquitted, he would not have been permitted by the mob to leave the courtroom
without the protection of the troops. Counsel was prevented from moving for
a continuance, for a change of venue, or for a new trial by the fear of mob
violence.
27 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoC. § 346.
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order staying the trial of the indictment until such application for
removal can be made.28 It is revealing to examine what a defendant
in various states must establish in order to be granted a change of
venue. In New York where the most liberal test is used, Section
344 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a change of venue
when "a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county or
city where the indictment is pending." This provision has been so
interpreted that a' defendant may obtain a change of venue if he is
even able to demonstrate that there is a strong probability that bias
exists in the community where the indictment is pending.29 In
Georgia, however, the defendant must show that there is a "prob-
ability or danger of lynching or other violence".3 ° The statute does
not require this result inasmuch as it provides that the defendant
may move for a change of venue whenever in his judgment an im-
partial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime is
alleged to have been committed.31 Yet, even where the danger of
lynching seems great, as for instance where sixty-five armed men are
required to guard the accused, a Georgia court may refuse a change
of venue. 32 In Texas the defendant must demonstrate that it is
"improbable" that he will receive a fair trial.33 In Illinois he need
only show that there is "reason for fear" that he will not receive a
fair trial.34
If the trial court denies an application for a change of venue,
there is no right to an immediate appeal.35 The case will proceed
to trial and in the event of a conviction, the order denying the motion
for a change of venue may be considered on appeal.36 However,
the granting of a change rests in the discretion of the trial court,
and the appellate court will not order one unless it is convinced
that this discretion has been abused.37 The fact that a jury has been
obtained has been held to indicate that the prejudice was not suffi-
cient to prevent a fair trial.38 But elements of force or feeling may
influence a jury subconsciously, and cases may well arise where it
28 Id. § 347.
29 People v. Nathan, 139 Misc. 345, 249 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1931).
30 Butler v. State, 56 Ga. App. 126, 192 S. E. 238 (1937); Goumas v.
State, 44 Ga. App. 210, 160 S. E. 682 (1931).
31 GA. CODE ANN. (Park, et aL, 1936) tit. 27, § 1201; GA. PENAL CODE§964.
3 2 James v. State, 178 Ga. 761, 174 S. E. 237 (1934).
33 Pope v. State, 126 Tex. Cr. 35, 70 S. W. (2d) 193 (1934).
34 People v. Anderson, 350 Ill. 603, 183 N. E. 588 (1932).
35 People v. Birndell, 194 App. Div. 776, 185 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1921),
cited supra note 9.
36 People v. Grout, 166 App. Div. 220, 151 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1915).
37 Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919); People v. Henis, 168
Misc. 453, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 15 (1938).
38 Haddock v. State, 141 Fla. 132, 192 So. 802 (1939) ; People v. Ander-
son, 350 Ill. 603, 183 N. E. 588 (1932).
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is as essential to change the situs, as it is to have a jury filling the
requirements of the law.
39
When a change of venue is directed, the question arises as to
where the case will be sent. Usually this is left to the discretion
of the trial judge,40 though various states have limited this power.
Alabama requires that the cause shall be sent to the nearest county
or county seat free from prejudice ;41 Indiana requires the change to
be made to the most convenient county ;42 Kentucky to an adjoining
county free from objection ;43 Illinois to the nearest county without
prejudice ;44 and New Mexico requires a county within a limited
contiguous area.45 This latter requirement seems unfortunate be-
cause prejudice rarely respects territorial subdivisions. In New York
the ordinary procedure is to select an adjoining county, though if
circumstances require a change to a more remote county, it can be
so ordered.46  Under the United States judicial code a federal court
of one judicial district may transfer a criminal prosecution to an-
other district generally, but has no power to transfer it to a par-
ticular county in the latter district, that being a matter for deter-
mination by the court of that district on application after the transfer
is made.47  Most states allow only one change of venue,48 and this
restriction has been held constitutional.49  This rule appears to be
needlessly rigid. The same forces which operated to prevent a fair
and impartial trial in the initial county may arise in the second, even
though the trial court has been very careful in selecting an unbiased
community. To refuse an additional change of venue constitutes an
injury to the victim of the prejudice, rather than a deterrent to those
forces which threaten the existence of a fair and impartial trial. Venue
should be changed whenever local prejudice creates an obstacle to
a fair trial; a blanket provision limiting the number of changes is
unfair.
In Maryland and Indiana it is required that a requested change
of venue be granted automatically in capital offenses. 50 Missouri has
taken a step forward by granting changes as a matter of right when
3 Jones v. Commonwealth, III Va. 862, 69 S. E. 953 (1911).
40 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 266 Ky. 662, 99 S. W. (2d) 774 (1936) ; Tinn
v. District Court, 17 N. D. 135, 114 N. W. 472 (1908).
41 Patterson v. State, 234 Ala. 342, 175 So. 371, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 733(1937),
42 Burns v. State, 192 Ind. 427, 136 N. E. 857 (1922).
43 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 266 Ky. 662, 99 S. W. (2d) 774 (1936).
44 ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 146, § 19.
45 N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1929) § 147-108.
46 People v. Baker, 3 Abb. Pr., 3 Parker Cr. 181 (N. Y. 1856).
47 Hale v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
48 Lee v. State, 164 Md. 550, 165 Atl. 614, cert. denied, 290 U. S. 639(1933) ; ALA. CODE (Michie, et a., 1941) tit. 15, § 269.
49 Patterson v. State, 234 Ala. 342, 175 So. 371, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 733
(1937).
50 MD. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 8; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 9-1305.
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the forum is in a county of less then 75,000.51 One whose life is
at stake is entitled to every possible guarantee that he will be given
a fair and impartial trial. It is undeniable that if an absolute right
to a change of venue in cases involving felonies were to be granted,
it would at times be used as a dilatory tactic. But this is far out-
weighed by the added assurance that the trial would be conducted
on its merits rather than on preconceived notions of guilt. Another
desirable safeguard is the vesting of power in the trial judge to order
a change on his own motion without the concurrence of either coun-
sel.52 This power should be liberally exercised to rectify the omis-
sions of incompetent or disinterested counsel, or counsel who fears
that he will be the victim of mob violence if he should venture to
move for a change of venue.5 3 Alabama has adopted a statute where-
by the trial judge may with the consent of the defendant, ez mero
inwtu, direct and order a change of venue whenever in his judgment
there is danger of mob violence, and it is advisable to have a military
guard to protect the defendant.5 4 It is submitted that the trial judge
should be granted the power of ordering a change of venue, in the
event that counsel fails to do so, long before local prejudice assumes
the proportions of a danger of mob violence. The New York Code
of Criminal Procedure makes no provision for the trial judge to
order a change of venue on his own motion. It may well be that
denial of a change of venue in certain cases is in effect a denial of
the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by state constitutions. 55
Responsibility for a fair trial lies fundamentally upon the states.
However resort to the federal courts may both prevent injustice in
individual cases and aid the states in the achievement of higher
procedural standards. Where the highest court of the state has
gffirmed a conviction allegedly surrounded with prejudice, appeal
may be had to the United States Supreme Court on the ground the
defendant has been denied the due process of law required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. A writ of habeas corpus may also be
sought from a federal district court,56 but it is necessary for the
petitioner to have exhausted his remedies in the state courts.5 7 The
Supreme Court held in Moore v. Dempsey that the Fourteenth
Amendment renders a "mob-dominated trial" void.56 For as Justice
5 Mo. STAT. ANx. (1932) p. 3194, § 3630.
52 Parrish v. State, 134 Tex. Cr. 545, 116 S. W. (2d) 706 (1938); GA.
CODE ANN. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 27, § 1201.
53 Downer v. Duraway, 53 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
54 ALA. CODE (Michie, et al., 1941) tit. 15, § 268.
55 Some state constitutions require an impartial trial by jury, e.g., ALA.
CoxsT. Art. I, § 6. The absence of this adjective, however, seems immaterial,
for a requirement of impartiality should be inferred, particularly in view of
the due process clause in many state constitutions.
56 U. S. CODE (1934) tit. 28, § 453.
57 Wilson v. Lanagan, 99 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938), cert. denied,
306 U. S. 634 (1939); Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
58 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
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Holmes said, "if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask-
that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the state courts failed
to correct the wrong-neither perfection in the machinery for cor-
rection nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no
other way of avoiding an immediate out-break of the mob can pre-
vent this court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional
rights". 59 However it is not clear whether prejudice of a less tangible
nature will result in a trial being declared void. In Frank v. Mangun,
the Supreme Court held that a trial during which disorders occurred
in and about the courtroom, was not violative of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 The increased willingness
of the United States Supreme Court to examine the practice of state
courts as they affect civil liberties has been pronounced during the
past two decades. That Court has held that a trial wherein negroes
have been excluded from the jury constituted a denial of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 that a conviction
based upon a confession obtained by compulsion, 62 or by the presen-
tation of testimony known to the prosecuting authorities to be per-
jured,6 3 or wherein the accused has not had a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice and the assignment of counsel has
not been timely,6 4 is not consistent with the due process clause. In
Herbert v. Louisiana, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
required that state action shall be consistent with the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice.6 5 And as was said by former Chief
Justice Hughes in Brown v. Mississippi, "the state is free to regulate
the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions
of policy, unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental". 66 It is to be hoped that this recent tendency to
pass judgment upon the procedural standards of state courts will
bring forth a broadening of the holding of Moore v. Dempsey.In 1866 Congress passed a statute providing for removal to a
federal court when "any criminal prosecution is commenced in any
state court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is
denied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state, or in
the part of the state where such suit or prosecution is pending, any
59 Id. at 91.
60237 U. S. 309 (1914).
61 Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 .(1940) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S.
354 (1939) ; Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 587 (1935).
62 Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547 (1941) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S.
530 (1940) ; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940) ; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227 (1939); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1935).
63 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
64 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
65 272 U. S. 312 (1926).
66297 U. S. 278, 285 (1935).
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rights secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights
of citizens of the United States or of all persons within the juris-
diction of the United States". 67 This statute was intended to sup-
plement the Fourteenth Amendment and its constitutionality has been
upheld.68 It was initially construed to give a right to removal be-
cause of local prejudice.69  The Supreme Court subsequently held
it to apply only to cases where the defendant was unable to enforce
his civil rights because of a state statute, and not where this was
prevented by administrative or judicial action.7 0 Local prejudice has
been expressly held not to be within the statute.7 1 In Virginia v.
Rivers the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot know that
the equal protection of the laws will not be extended to him until
the trial has taken place.7 2  However this disregards two of the
fundamental principles of venue, i.e., that when there is sufficient
belief to warrant the improbability of a fair and impartial trial in
a. particular locality the situs will be changed, and that it is never
necessary to have an experimental trial to determine the existence of
prejudice. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court, in view of
its concern with civil liberties, will restore the removal statute to
its original function, so that in the event that a state is unable to
give a fair and impartial trial to an accused, a federal court will.
THEODORE KRIEGER.
INcOME TAX DEDuCTIONS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES
The advent of war, coupled with the necessity of extraordinary
governmental expenditure, has brought increasing consciousness of
the necesity to finance and control our national economy through
tax legislation. Under the pressure of group controversy, pressure
politics, and lobbies for selected interests, each particular law achieves
its passage and represents a compromise between various opposing
forces. Moreover, it very often happens that there is a last minute
rush provoked by national urgency to meet the needs of emergencies.
The result is invariably some progressive measures interspersed with
67 U. S. CODE (1934) tit. 28, § 74.
68Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879).
69 State v. Dunlap, 65 N. C. 491 (1871).
70 Kentucky v. Power, 201 U. S. 1 (1906); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U. S. 565 (1896) ; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 (1882) ; Virginia v. Rivers,
100 U. S. 313 (1879); State of New Jersey v. Weiberger, 38 F. (2d) 298
(D. C. N. J. 1930).
71 Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N. E. 463 (1935) ; Lewson
v. Superior Court, 12 F. Supp. 812 (N. D. Cal. 1935) ; California v. Chue Fan,
42 Fed. 865 (C. C: N. D. Cal. 1890); Texas v. Gaines, 23 Fed. Cas. 869, No.
13847 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1874).
72 100 U. S. 313 (1879).
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